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1Chapter 6
BLEEDING HEARTS AND BLOODY MINDS
REASON IN ACTION IN ALTRUISTIC BENEVOLENCE
Introduction
Kant argued that instrumental rationality was not the only foundation for conduct. Quite the
reverse. Charitable acts were examples of a moral, rational logic, a logic of practical reason focussed
on a hope for a moral world in which all humans would be treated as ends and not as means only.
Clearly such charitable acts, assuming even that they exist in reality, are not what is meant by a
charitable act governed by the heart. The self legislation to undertake a dutiful act in the conduct
towards another resulting in practical laws of the head is not to be confused with the law of the heart
that dictates other-directed behaviour. The latter is based on affects and not rational self-legislation
under a universal law of reason or even rational deliberation.
Nor are charitable acts dictated by the heart to be confused with ethical conduct towards
another with whom you share the same impulses. For example, when Fichte in Book III of The
Vocation of Man advocates furthering the goals of others to the “utmost of thy power’ and to honour
their freedom and take up their purposes as thine own, this conduct is dictated neither by the head or
the heart, but by impulses and the will. Further, they are only directed at those beings who belong to
one’s own Volk and who have the same impulses. That is why those others are treated as free and
independent. But acts of self-giving to one’s own kith and kin are only marginally altruistic, if they are
altruistic at all.
Hegel in the section of the Phenomenology of Spirit1 dealing with “The law of the heart and
the frenzy of self-conceit,” is concerned with affect motivated conduct which is seen to be rational
because it is governed, not by impulses which dictate the will and then conceptualized by reason, nor a
self-legislated law of reason where reason dictates the will and reason’s goal is to express and realize a
moral end. Hegel is concerned with charitable acts towards others dictated by a feeling towards the
other, a feeling which is universalized.
In this chapter I want to make two sets of claims. Both sets of claims concur in the conviction
that Hegel got it right. Both say that the situation Hegel depicts in the phenomenology of experience is
actually found in experience. The first set of claims are about perceptions and understanding and has
two parts. First, my account of what Hegel depicts represents what Hegel depicts. Second, the kind of
activity Hegel depicts is actually found in experience. The second set relate to the dynamics of that
experience, the “logic” of its development, the dynamic of what happens. Again, one part of the claim is
that the logic of the process I describe represents the dialectical process in the Phenomenology.2 
Secondly, for those who have participated in the experience of humanitarian organizations or who have
studied their behaviour, Hegel’s account  makes sense of that experience. We become self-conscious
2about what happens in humanitarian activities. Though the account does not explain the dynamics in any
causal sense, our sense of humanitarian activities is forever altered.
Humanitarianism in the World
The humanitarian acts that Hegel is concerned with are acts in which the individual, through
humanitarian communities, offers aid to the needy. Now those familiar with the work of humanitarian
organizations are very impressed with their dedication and amazing work in what are often arduous
circumstances. But one also comes to know how competitive that world is, how, for, example, with the
publicity on the “million” Hutu refugees who crossed into Goma in Zaire in July of 1994 fleeing from
Rwanda, over 200 agencies flocked to the Zairean refugee camps to assist the refugees, how they did
so oblivious to the fact that 10-20% of these “refugees” were genocidal killers, how the more
sophisticated of them vied to get a location next to the camp entrance so they would be more likely to
get publicity from the hordes of arriving TV crews, how they exaggerated the numbers they served, and
how they self-righteously criticize international agencies, international peace forces, and local
governments according to their own moral principles but seemed incapable or largely blind to
understanding the values and norms that govern the conduct of government and international agencies
and organizations.
Let me begin offer a midrash to illustrate this loose generalization. I got off the train at Kingston
in April of 1995 and was met by a soldier who was to drive me to the military base in Kingston to
interview an army officer. He was young, hardly out of his teens, if not still a teenager. I asked him if he
had ever served abroad. He told me that he had. “Where?” I asked. “Rwanda” came the answer. From
a casual interest in filling the air with conversation in the long drive to the military base, my attention
suddenly increased fivefold. After some preliminary explorations of what he did there and what he saw,
I asked him what was the most important lesson he learned from serving in Rwanda. “I’ll never give
another dollar to any overseas charity again,” he answered. I was surprised. He had witnessed the
greatest failure in the UN history since Palestine was partitioned, he had watched UN peacekeepers
turn tail and abandon a country just when a genocide of a million people was beginning, and what he
had learned was not to give money to charity. “Why? I asked, though when I heard the answer I was
no longer as surprised as I was when the answer seemed so divorced from my own preoccupations
about Rwanda. 
“We were living in crowded barracks, living on meagre rations because the UN had not yet
sent over funds for us. We were working in all our spare time in orphanages and helping the Rwandese
kids. In contrast, the guys working in the international charities were living in big houses that they rented
and which increased the rents for the locals. They drove jeeps with all the bells and whistles. They ate in
the local restaurants all the time. They were always suspicious of us UN peacekeepers. Even worse,
they were snobs; they wouldn’t even give us soldiers the time of day. But what was the worst, they
could not get along. They are supposed to care about people, care about serving people. I drove my
commander to the weekly briefings when they came to General Dallaire’s headquarters. As far as I am
3concerned, from what I saw, they were only interested in glory for themselves and their own charity.
They fought with each other like cats and dogs. They couldn’t even cooperate with each other to
organize their work. Most of the energy was used up in fighting with the government, with us, with the
UN representatives, and, most of all, with each other. If they were in the army, they would have been
shot or ........[He said something else but I did not recognize the army slang.] They should have all been
sent home.”
Giving due allowance for the exaggerations involved in the account, what he described was
recognizable, Here are charities committed to helping others in a remote setting, where cooperation is
critical to ensure the delivery of food and shelter, sanitation and health services to those displaced by
the civil war, yet personal egos and the concern with the status of one’s own charity often undercut the
good work in which these charities were engaged.
Individuals of good will who have a genuine sympathy for the people they help, people who
need clothes and food, need roofs over their head and inoculations to prevent ravages like cholera,
these individuals who serve on the front lines of crises to deliver these services and who save the lives
of millions every year, are also competitive and  conflictual if not downright petty and catty. In my
experience, the politics of humanitarianism makes university politics look like child’s play.3
Is there any connection between the motives driving the humanitarian service and the frenzy that
occurs among competing humanitarian agencies? What is the relationship between the seeking of
publicity and humanitarianism? Is it just a matter of being the only way to get the money to keep the
charitable work going? Why are “facts” so easily deformed if they might interfere with the enhancement
of humanitarian service? 
Does a phenomenological account allow us to “understand” this apparent contradiction
between the good will and sypathetic concern for those served and what appears to be the bad will and
unsympathetic attitude to others from different charities or from the local government or representing
UN agencies? More specifically, does Hegel’s phenomenological account in the section of the
Phenomenology of Spirit, the section entitled “The law of the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit,”
allow us to “understand” this phenomenon in some sense?
Differentiating Humanitarianism
There are various types of humanitarianism. For example, there are “rescuers”, individuals who
take great risks to save others from certain death, as in genocide, not because they were related or
because they knew those who they saved before they acted. In the empirical study of rescuers, they do
not go through any reflection to determine whether such an act should be governed by a personal
maxim that could become a universal moral law for all mankind. In fact, they do not seem to act out of
any sense of external duty to a principle. In spite of the vast amount of counter evidence, they believe
that anyone would [NOTE, not should] do what they did. They almost inevitably claim that what they
4did was nothing special or heroic, a statement that does not seem to be made out of false modesty.4 
Further, rather than their acts being an expression of an act of freedom, there seems to be a
necessity to their actions. They almost always say that they had no choice. They had to do what they
did. So it does not seem to be a rational principle, nor an impulse of the moment that dictates their
action. The risk taken to save another does not seem to be either the act of a rational or an impulsive
will. They seem to be genuine acts of the heart to help another in a situation in which there is often great
risk to themselves.
Though such humanitarian actions bear a resemblance to the ones Hegel is concerned with in
the section on the law of the heart, acts of heroic rescue in which one takes a genuine risk of one’s own
life for the sake of another are different. Humanitarian heroism is not to be confused with humanitarian
service. The latter usually involves very little risk. More importantly, humanitarian heroism is the
exception, while humanitarian service is the norm. Self risk for another is relatively rare in spite of the
beliefs of those undertaking the action. Most importantly, acts of rescue at risk to oneself are almost
always acts of individuals; no communal sympathy is involved. Precisely because of its exceptionalism
and its individualism, heroic humanitarianism if it is to be examined phenomenologically, belongs to the
phenomenological examination of an individual self-conscious individual who is sure of him or herself,
and not to the phenomenological account of reason in general.
Thus, the phenomenological account of humanitarian service is not intended to be an account of
all humanitarian acts, nor even of all acts that can be universalized under reason, but only those dictated
by the heart rather than the will or “pure” reason.
Adam Smith and the Scottish Sentimentalists
Whether Hegel had the Scottish sentimentalists in mind is a matter of debate, but they seem to
fit the role.5 For example, in Adam Smith there are two foundations for benefiting others. One is where
an individual governs his behaviour only from his self interest and their own advantages, but through the
law of the invisible hand of economics, that self interest turns into the benefit of all.
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner,
but from their regard from their own interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to
their self-love, and never talk to them of necessities, but of their advantage. (Adam Smith, The
Theory of Moral Sentiments, New York: Kelley, 1966 (1759), p. 47.
But another motive governed human action towards another. For “there are some principles in
his nature which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him,
though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the
emotion which we feel for the misery of others.” (Op. Cit.) The humane feel this emotion with the most
“exquisite sensibility” but it is common to all of humanity. 
5There are two feelings and one rational product that results from such motives. The first feeling
is pity, what we ourselves feel when we observe another in trouble. Compassion is our fellow feeling for
another human being, what we feel when we put ourselves in the position of another human being who
is in trouble. This benevolence is the same for every human being, though experienced to different
degrees, and is a product of the logic of the situation rather than an empathetic identification with the
sufferer. We do not enter into the feelings of the other, but into the situation in which the other finds him
or herself.
From this pity and compassion alone we do not get the sympathy that produces
humanitarianism.6 That requires a community of sentiments, of sharing the same feelings of pity and
compassion with others. That shared sentiment based on feelings of pity and compassion leads to
action, normally referred to as humanitarianism. The logic of the situation of both the victim and the
rescuer, and the communication among them all, determine whether there is a shared sentiment. This
shared sentiment is the prime, though not the exclusive, motive governing the actions of those involved
in NGOs serving refugees abroad or the dispossessed and displaced generally. When it is difficult to
put oneself in another’s shoes, then the sympathy evoked is bound to be quite weak. This is the law of
the heart, that our pity and compassion will be felt in direct proportion to the familiarity with the pain
and pleasure felt and in inverse proportion to the difficulty of identifying with the pain of suffering or the
pleasure of relief. 
That is why this feeling of sentiment which unites our actions is not an individualistic response. It
is a self-conscious one in that we are required to go through a rational exercise to determine the degree
of sympathy based on the sentiments of pity and compassion evoked. The response is governed by the
logic of the situation which necessarily results in the sentimental response. Though different individuals
may feel the pity and compassion to different degrees, the logic of the situation necessitates that we all
experience that same pity and compassion. Further, self-consciousness is now operating on a
communal rather than an individual level. Thirdly, the language of humanitarianism is categorical - the
situation and the common sympathy evoked demand our response. 
Relationship of the Law of the Heart to Pleasure and Necessity
In Hegel’s account of the “law of the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit”, the preceding section
of the phenomenology is entitled “pleasure and necessity”. The divided, self-alienated world of the
individual who seeks to remake himself by immersing himself in the world of pleasure, is concretized by
the professor who abandons his books and the isolation of his study for the fleshpots of the world and
the pleasures of the flesh. It is Faust in his encounter with Gretchen and Gretchen with him.
This section of the phenomenology is followed by its ostensible opposite. From self seeking
hedonism of romantic love, the phenomenological account turns to the giving of the self in service to
another. How did the hedonistic search for pleasure in the world end up, not simply in nihilism and the
annihilation of the self, but in serving others? 
6In the hedonistic search for oneself in the life of pleasure, one found that pleasure in another self
conscious human being - in the search for sexual satisfaction, for example, or in the search for finding
the imaginary mate as one’s true love. The latter self seeks to find himself in another with whom there
will be a shared oneness. But because a person only sought pleasure for himself or sought to find the
realization of an ideal in pleasure, all that is achieved is ephemeral. The pleasure was momentary and
evaporated. This was true not only for Faust seeking hedonistic pleasure, but for Gretchen, who
wanted pleasure in the unity of two as one. Individual self-satisfaction and the search for the identity of
two as one, sex and love, are at odds. The necessary conflict of sex versus love leads, not to the end of
uniting two as one, but to the sundering not only of the relationship, but of the sense of oneself
altogether. One is shattered by the collapse. 
But this is only one half of the trajectory. The other half is that sex naturally (and often, at least
before birth control) results in pregnancy. The two are united as one in the body of another, a child. So
instead of the personal self satisfaction of sex that Faust seeks, instead of the personal self satisfaction
of love that Gretchen seeks, Faust finds death and Gretchen finds a new life to which she can serve and
which serves as the archetype of identification with and service to others.
So instead of seeking a unity of the self with another as the goal, in the section on “the law of
the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit”, we begin to act where we already feel that unity, where that
unity is the starting point not the goal, where feelings produce the unity, but the unity is not dependent
on the feelings but on the logic of a certain situation. The pursuit of pleasure for oneself in and through
another will turn into the pleasure one gets in serving another. 
The Law of the Heart
In humanitarian service, in the pleasure one obtains in serving another, one’s actions are not
determined by choice but by necessity. We go to serve where natural disasters or human wars demand
we go. We are servants of necessity rather than exemplifications of personal freedom. Further, this
necessity is not simply a contingently external one. It is a categorical internal necessity. When I go into
humanitarian service, it is because I am commanded to do it. My heart dictates that I must go. The
ancient Egyptians said of their slaves that they had no hearts because, as for many peoples, the heart
signifies the personality itself. For inhumanitarians, “This discovery, which is as positive as a law of
physics, authorizes him (the Egyptian) to treat the serf like an inanimate object.” 7 The law of the heart
in humanitarianism dictates that we offer service to any human in need. 
There are three sides to this internal necessity in the law of the heart. The law is universal in
applying to all humans; every human is identified as having a heart and, therefore, worthy of heartfelt
service. The law is necessary in that the feeling of response is said to be in all humans, though the feeling
may, in actuality, be experienced to different degrees depending on the situation and the responder’s
identification with the situation. Thirdly, the law of the heart is universal not only in being universal in its
application, not only in being universal in those who experience it, but it is universal in characterizing
7what in essence it means to be human. The law of the heart has ethical ontological status. The law of the
heart defines who a human being is in essence, someone who has sympathy for every human being and
who expresses that sympathy in action.
This means that every human being not only experiences this sympathy, but the law demands
not only that we target those for whom the sympathy is felt, but we try to actualize ourselves as
sympathetic human beings. We do so by trying to act upon our sympathies. And we do so in a real
world in which our hearts bleed precisely in situations in which bloody mindedness is so extant, in
situations governed seemingly by heartlessness, in situations where refugees, the displaced, the
unwanted, are persecuted, neglected and treated as having no hearts, as being not human. 
Immediately, a contradiction is encountered between the universal presumptions of the law of
the heart and the situations attended to by the actions dictated by the law of the heart. There, the law of
the heart will be enormously challenged by the situations it meets. Superheart encounters reality, “a
reality which is the opposite of what is to be realized”. (Hegel, 369) The reality contradicts the law and
the rational assertion about the universal character of humanity because the reality reveals humans as
heartless, uncaring towards those close to them never mind distant strangers. The law of the jungle
seems to prevail wherein life is experienced as “nasty, brutish and short.” It seems to be a heartless,
dog-eat-dog world.
Against the positive presumption that all humans have a heart is the demonstration of
heartlessness as well as the presumption by the heartless that those who are the victims are worthy of
that victimization because they lack a heart, lack a human personality. But in the negativity of the
victimizers, they seem to share the same presumption, that humans consists of those who share common
sentiments, differing only in those entitled to enter into membership in the human club, that is, in whether
its membership is restrictive or all inclusive. The humanitarians, thus, have a twofold task, to give
witness to the law of the heart by treating the victims as part of humanity and relieving their suffering. At
the same time they must, like Christian missionaries, convince those who inflict that cruelty that they and
their victims share a common humanity. If they do not succeed in the latter task, the presumption that all
humans are dictated by the law of the heart will be undermined. Further, in caring for the suffering and
appealing to the victimizers, they must always deal with those who inflict cruelty as if they had a heart
and potentially could care for their victims. Thus, Africa Watch appealed to President Habyarimana of
Rwanda, the head of the regime whose actions had already been labelled genocidal by an international
human rights commission in January of 1993, to ensure these abuses stopped. It was akin to appealing
to the head of the mafia to ask him to prevent criminal activity. But what else could the bleeding hearts
do since the use of coercive force to counter the abuses was ruled out by definition.
In this activity, both in caring for the victims and in the form of address to the victimizers, the
humanitarians express “the earnestness of a high purpose which seeks its pleasure in displaying the
excellence of its own nature, and in promoting the welfare of mankind.” (Hegel 370) In contrast to the
levity of the hedonist who seeks pleasure as an individual, the humanitarians try to demonstrate in their
8actions “the universal pleasure of all hearts,” in which the pleasure is to be found in following the law of
the heart, and doubled when following the law of the heart leads to the relief of suffering. 
The Encounter with Heartlessness
But the action is undisciplined. The humanitarians revel in voluntarism, celebrate individualism
as the mode through which the essence of all of us as heartfelt will be demonstrated. Reality is
otherwise inclined. For the law of the jungle demonstrates a contrary inclination, but without any self-
consciousness. There is no intention on the part of those inflicting cruelty to make the law they live by
universal. It is just what they accept as the given. They do not even revel in transgressing the law of the
heart because they have no real consciousness of the law of the heart as a contending order. They inflict
cruelty simply because that is the way of the world, but without that way being even thought about or
reflected upon.
So how do the victimizers cope with the do-gooders. By treating them as irrelevant, a mere
cover for other self-enhancing goals. The humanitarians and their activities are not real, but illusionary.
They provide no counter-authority to challenge the victimizers’ view of the world. In fact, the cruel
exploiters will often pay lip service to caring humanitarianism and human rights, cooperating with the
humanitarian agencies as they cynically exploit them to suck foreign aid into the country and to ensure
these agencies provide another source of exploitation through robbery, fraud and lucrative contracts,
such as those for trucking aid supplies to the homeless in camps. Thus, the victimizers, even when they
superficially conform to the law of the heart, demonstrate its falsity as a universal, because their
satisfaction is not obtained in conforming with the law but in the use of the law for self-interested
purposes. Rather than revealing by this conformity that they are in essence full of heart, the victimizers
seem to demonstrate the reverse. 
But in following appearances, they encounter those for whom the law of the heart is the essence
of who they are. And the victimizers at the very least become self-conscious that the law of the jungle
does not seem to govern everyone. The victimizers witness genuine dedication, deep and sustained
caring for the suffering of others, and a sense of identification with victims rather than victimizers. 
If there is some degree of small victory with the victimizers, it does not come free of cost to the
humanitarians. For in the victimizers coming to recognize that the law of the heart governs the actions of
at least some people, the humanitarians also accept that the victimizers are not governed by the law. But
even if the law of the heart counters contradictions, the humanitarians carry on in spite of that reality
with a determination to establish the law of the heart by their actions even if the law is not a description
of reality. The humanitarian “carries out the law of his (my emphasis) heart,” (Hegel 372) and does so
as if it were universal, experiencing satisfaction and pleasure in giving him or herself over to the
authority of that law.
The Alienation of the Law from the Heart
9That has its costs. For instead of being a descriptive law of the character of pity and
compassion in all humans translated into action based on sentiment, the law is not a law of the heart at
all, but an external norm dictating to the individual what ought to be the case. Further, what the heart
feels is now a matter of indifference since the action is no longer based on a law of the heart. Thus, qua
ordinance, the law is no longer his ordinance; only the responsibility for realization is his. Does he obey
the law of the jungle or the law of sentiment which is no longer the law of his heart? He now has a
choice, and, thereby, even for him, the law of sentiment has lost the universality of its obligatory force.
What was once ethically required was also demanded by his nature. Now it is merely a matter of
choice.
There is also a benefit. In freeing himself from the necessity of the law, by making the law
depend entirely on his choice and commitment in carrying it out, he is no longer just a particular
expression of the law. Quite the reverse. The law becoming a universal now depends on him. He in turn
is raised to a universal through expressing the law. Instead of a necessary particular, the humanitarian
has become a free universality. His essential character is no longer acting true to his feelings, but acting
so his own feelings become the norm. The humanitarian has posited himself as free, and reality as an
open possibility. Hence, he and reality are no longer governed by necessity but, rather are essentially
free.
But if he now suborns himself to the universal, it has only been by making himself a particular
opposed to the universal. For before, every heart was supposed to feel the same way, and the actions
based on those feelings were supposed to be what anyone would do.  Now, however, the action is
what he has chosen to do; “only the heart of this individual has placed its reality in its deed, which
expresses for him his-being-for-self or his pleasure.” (Hegel 373) The effect on the victimizers or the
victims is clear. Others who are not humanitarian have no need to see themselves as carrying out what
was once called the law of the heart. Quite the reverse, since the humanitarian defines reality in his own
way, as an order dictated by his sentiment, so they find
that their passions and feelings, directed towards exploiting those who they can, is as valid a position as
that of any feely. 
It is the effect on the humanitarian that is critical. Whereas before, he believed that the
victimizers were essentially good and governed by the same feelings of pity and compassion as he, now
he finds their behaviour, and whatever is in their hearts that govern their actions, detestable. 
Everything he formerly believed that governed the humanitarian is now alien to him. The law is not
universal in applying to all humans, so why should every human be worthy of heartfelt service? The
emotional response to the same situation is not universal. Thirdly, the law of the heart is not universal in
characterizing what in essence it means to be human. The whole foundation of the humanitarian’s world
view as the basis for his actions has crumbled in its encounter with reality and the effort to ensure that
the law actually governed all of reality.
The situation is even worse for him than he knows. For once his beliefs were based on the
10
immediacy of his feelings and the belief that those feelings were held by everyone and were applicable
to everyone. Now the belief is simply a postulated feeling, but with no basis in universality, and the
humanitarian bleeding heart has not yet recognized the postulate as an ethical maxim that can be raised
to a universal by the power of his reason.  So the relevance of his particular feeling is lost without being
replaced by a universal thought or idea. The humanitarian is burnt out. He is dead to himself and
merely acts out the feelings of compassion, but his heart is no longer in his work. Instead, he now
believes that compassion depends upon belief, not the universality of feelings, depends upon an
ordinance but given vital motion by an individual passionately committed to it.  But the burnt out
humanitarian no longer sees himself as exemplifying that passion.
In this way self-consciousness is related to a twofold antithetic essence; it is in its own self a
contradiction, and is distraught in its inmost being. The law of this particular heart is alone that in
which self-consciousness recognizes itself; but the universally valid order has, through the
realizing of that law, equally become for self-consciousness its own essential being and its own
reality. Thus, what contradicts itself in its consciousness has for it in each case the form of
essence and its own reality. (Hegel 375)
The alienation is experienced in duplicate. On one side, the humanitarian feels oneness with all
mankind, but if he is now to carry out that feeling, he can only do so by accepting his feelings as simply
belonging to him. On the other hand, what he now feels is not the pleasure and satisfaction brought by
his work based on that feeling, but the despair with reality and with his own lack of pleasure from his
work. And if that is now his essential feeling, then what is projected on the world as a universal is a
universal order of despair. That is enough to make anyone deranged. For your feelings of immediate
oneness in the world as your basis for giving yourself in service to that world is now irrelevant to the
workings of the world, an initial naive fantasy without any reality whatsoever.
The word derangement is not used loosely. One has become fundamentally schizophrenic, but
not in the clinical sense. For in this self-alienation, the madness is projected onto the world. For if what
is now posited as objectively essential to the unity of the world, though no longer experienced
immediately as the real, is a sympathy of one human being for another, as the empty form of what was
immediately felt with such great passion and urgency. What is experienced is precisely the opposite of
this fellow feeling, a despair at the cruelty of the world and at one’s own alienation from the immediate
feeling that brought one into the service of humanity. The humanitarian now wallows in the nothingness
of himself while professing the positivity and unity of the world of sentiment. And his essence is to hold
both to be true - the unity of the world in feeling, and his despair with himself and the possibility of
having any such feeling. And that is just the way the world is. He is not crazy. The world is just a mad
place.
The Frenzy of Self-Conceit
When the bleeding heart reaches this point, he has usually become the head of a mission and
attends the meetings and consultations where decisions are made. And that is almost exactly the time
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when the immediacy of feeling with all humanity has now passed into the ‘ravings of an insane self-
conceit.” (Hegel 377) The feely now furiously tries to preserve himself from falling apart by declaring
the mad world of cruelty to be based precisely on the indifference and despair he finds now within
himself. The world is not based on universal fellow feeling and sentiment, but on indifference, cynicism
and surrender of any immediate care for the world. Those who exploit humanity whom he formerly
believed to share in a fellow feeling to which he once appealed, is now seen as experiencing emptiness,
coldness and cruelty, precisely the Hobbesian law his law of the human heart first encountered as an
alien proposition. The exploiters exploit others because they feel so self degraded themselves. This is
the universal psychological law that governs the world, not the universality of fellow feeling. 
Like its original, it is a law of the heart, but of a perverted and twisted heart which tries to make
reality conform to its own inner turmoil and degradation. It is not a law as a given, but a law which it
tries to enforce on the world. Hence, it is not an existing valid law. Nor could it be a universal law for its
enactment would entail mutual annihilation. So what the heart now feels or what, more importantly, is
now said to characterize the heart of the world, is both unreal, since it is a mere projection, and
unrealizable. 
It is in the context of this realization that the bleeding hearts who have now become possessed
of this self-conceit enter into the frenzy and hysteria of cooperating with other players in the situation
and with one another. Someone proposes a solution to a problem. Another replies, “What’s wrong with
the way we do it now?” Without fellow feeling and the unity of sentiment, all each individual can do is
attempt to keep from flying apart by seeing everyone else as an exemplification of the process of
indifference, cruelty and self-seeking. The humanitarians wrangle over the smallest minutiae as if the
existence of the world depended upon it, for in their own experience, their own lives do depend on it.
Unless they hang onto something as the basis for order, they will fall apart. But they no longer have any
foundation for establishing any order, for universal order rested on their feelings, feelings which no
longer identify everyone as sharing the same sentiment, but rather identify each individual as pursuing his
or her own agenda. What is more, they are without the experience of the self-interested sector who
have come to recognize that out of the pursuit of their own self-interest, something will emerge for the
betterment of them all, so that all that is necessary is the negotiation of the rules of the competitive
game. However, among humanitarians, the game was supposed to be an interest in the benevolence of
the other which united them all, and what they now experience is that everyone is just pursuing their
own agenda but, unlike the self-interested possessive individualist, professing that their own particular
agenda represents the good of all. Moreover, they profess it as if their life depends on its realization “so
that even when they complain about this ordinance as if it went against their own inner law, and maintain
against it the opinions of the heart, they cling to it with their hearts, as being their essential being.” (Hegel
378) If they lose, they experience the loss as a loss of their whole being, for public order seems to
depend on the projection of what they feel to be the case.
The situation was made to breed conflict over everything and to make any solution
unsatisfactory to everyone else except the one who proposed it. And not superficially unsatisfactory,
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but as threatening the very foundations of the world. So the only universal at work is “a universal
resistance and struggle of all against one another, in which each claims validity for its own individuality,
but at the same time does not succeed in his efforts, because each meets with the same resistance from
the others, and is nullified in their reciprocal resistance.” (Hegel 379) The wonder is that anything is
accomplished at all. 
Instead of ‘you go your way, I’ll go mine,’ the perverted law of the heart demands universality
and objectification of the conclusions of the different feelings since the feelings themselves no longer
have a given status as universals. And the humanitarian now fights for his proposals as adamantly as he
once gave himself over in the service to others. What began as the counter to Hobbes’ universal state
of war has turned into something even worse, for even that war depended only on a limited area of
conflict, conflict over the protection of one’s person and property from the other. But now the conflict is
over the individual’s very being.
What started as the counter to the way of the world by presupposing that conflict was not the
way of the world, becomes the demonstration that it is the way of the world that seems to be the
universal. And the foundation of that world is individuality. If the way of the world as war is to be
overcome, it will now have to come as the expense of individuality per se, for it is the assertion of
individuality that seems to be the basis for the conflict.
Conclusion
Clearly, what Hegel describes as the extreme competition between individuals and the
humanitarian organizations they represent is found in experience, in fact is found so frequently in the
evaluations of humanitarian service delivery that one is surprised if anyone would be surprised by such
an empirical finding. What makes Hegel’s phenomenological analysis interesting, however, is not his
naming of what happens as the opposite of what it first appears to be, but his depiction of the “logic”
behind what happens and, therefore his account of why the experience of good will and fellow feeling
turns in practice to a competition that makes Bay Street or Wall Street look like a paradigm of order. 
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1. All reference are to the Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A.V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. The citations are
by paragraph number rather than the page.
2. Jean Hyppolite (Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1974) claims that this section is still about desire for pleasure, but a desire which has internalized
the ‘idea of law’. Instead of the Scottish sentimentalists, the model is seen to be Rousseau, Goethe’s Werther
[though H.S. Harris contends that Werther’s attitude does not seem to be lawlike - Hegel’s Ladder II: The Odyssey of
Spirit, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997, p. 33] and Karl Moor in Schiller’s play The Robbers [and even in the latter case,
Karl Moor, following Royce, is seen by Harris only as the exemplification of the frenzy of self-conceit..] The law
dictates that we follow our natural inclinations which are good as long as they are socially uncontaminated. It is
about original impulses. “The first impulse is always good.” Opposed to the law of the heart is a world of
meaningless necessity which “crushes individualities that avidly desire to enjoy their specificity.” (p. 285) Hyppolite
claims that the dynamic process of self realization is an internal one only, as the gap between the goal and the
actualization is realized. As Hyppolite says, “No sooner is it (the law of the heart) actualized than it escapes the
particular heart that gave it life.” (p. 286) 
There are many problems with Hyppolite’s explication of the text, but a few notes will suffice to indicate
why I believe his account of what Hegel depicts is far fetched. First, Hegel is not talking about a Fichtean “original
impulse” but about feelings, a law of the heart not of the will. Second, Hegel speaks explicitly of an “earnestness of
purpose” governing the law of the heart, in which pleasure is to be obtained in carrying out that purpose; the quest
and end is not pleasure itself. Thirdly, Hyppolite describes the opposing reality to the law of the heart as
“meaningless necessity”, empty formal rules that constrain the expression of individuality, but Hegel describes the
order as one of actual violence and not simply formal meaningless constraints. Finally, the actualization of the law of
the heart does not come to self realization immediately on trying to be actualized but in an actual encounter with the
way the world works and its violence. Hyppolite ignores the dialectical development that occurs in that world as that
world tries to deal with the “feelies” and, in turn, the repercussions on the feelies of that alteration. In fact, Hyppolite
skates over the surface and misses most of the steps in the dialectical development of spirit at this stage.
Harris, on the other hand, sees the law of the heart as the exemplification of Faust’s Earth-Spirit, as the spirit
of all natural life whereby the quest is “to live happily according to nature.” The “embodied Gestalt of the ‘law of the
heart’ is Rousseau,” (p. 34) in particular, the “Creed of Savoyard Vicar”, specifically in the reference to listening “to
what God says in the heart of man,” but this interpretation is only accomplished by knowingly and deliberately
ignoring both the Vicar’s original sense of self-alienation and the fact that the Vicar only sees the possibility of
overcoming that alienation in the next world when he is “freed from the fetters of the body”. Thus, if Hyppolite
equates the law of the heart with impulse, Harris initially equates it with “a natural instinct.” Certainly, in Emile,
Rousseau writes: “Liberty is not to be found in any form of government. It is in the heart of the free man.” (London:
William Heinemann, 1956, p. 165) So unlike Hyppolite, Harris finds the law of the heart rooted in natural feeling,
rather than either the impulse to pleasure that Hyppolite believes it to be or the natural feelings of pity and
compassion which I identify. 
However, the opposition to the law of the heart in Harris is not simply the same as Hyppolite contends it is,
the constraints of conventions and customs in a society. For the formal order is maintained by violence (p. 36), but
that violence is not expressed in the actual violations of the law of the heart with respect to pity and compassion
where I locate it. “Excellence, thus, does not consist in loving everyone, in desiring the happiness (or well-being) of
all,” (Harris, 38) but in alleviating pain and suffering, a far more modest task, but even that one becomes impossible
to achieve. And Harris himself (I think contradictorily) asserts that, “If I am sensitive to human suffering (and that
sensitivity is what ‘the law of the heart’ arises out of) my heart will ‘bleed’ every day about the decisions I must
make in pursuit of my ideal...The bleeding heart is part of the human lot.” (Harris, 39) Here Harris is correct; the
“philanthropic soul” is at the heart of the human lot, and not Rousseau’s natural free spirit. After all, the emotion
aroused by human suffering in Rousseau was personal, individual pain at the suffering of others, but not
compassion for the sufferer.
ENDNOTES
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Further, as for what is opposed to that law, I have difficulty in seeing how custom and convention are
characterized as necessary by definition. Of course, since the reality encountered is characterized as the opposite of
what is intended to be realized, the interpretation of  what is intended to be realized will directly colour how this
reality is characterized. Hegel, contra-Hyppolite, explicitly describes that reality as “a violent ordering of the world
which contradicts the law of the heart, a humanity suffering under that ordering.” (369) Now it is hard to see how
custom and convention, though not expressing the law of the heart, inherently and of necessity violate it. More
importantly, most customs and conventions do not order the world violently, and do not make humanity suffer. 
So the issue will be what the law of the heart has to be for violence and suffering to contradict that law.
And both Rousseau’s natural feeling of a free man and Hume and Adam Smith’s feeling for their fellow man could
both theoretically be candidates. But not in practice. For in my scenario, the violation of any one violates the law of
the heart. The violation of another does not affect the free man of nature if he is on a desert island or able to escape
the laws of civilization. Further, positive law is generally not that violent in practice, though such laws may violate
the feelings of a natural free spirit. Finally, Hegel (371) says that, “Humanity which is bound by this law (which
opposes the law of the heart) does not live in the blessed unity of the law with the heart.” Now positive law, custom
and convention are never binding on all humanity. Hegel cannot be referring to the restrictions of local customs,
conventions and laws, but to a law which is applicable to all humans in opposition to the law of the heart. I just do
not understand Harris’ claim (38) that this refers to a reality in which, “The World...is governed by a positive law.” 
Finally, the sense of Reason gone mad in the end is for Harris exemplified “by the standard of sanity,”
whereas in my depiction, reason has gone mad when the original law of the heart is inverted and the “feelies” begin
to be the ones who exemplify a war of all against all.  The madness is substantive and not simply to be found in
insane empty and meaningless rules of society. Harris himself says that the madness is set off when the bleeding
heart finds himself “living in a world of hard hearts” (Harris, 40) when the hard hearts confront the feelies about their
selectivity to some causes and indifference to others. But the hard hearts, in Hegel, are not self-conscious critics, but
users and abusers, including users and abusers of the sentiments of the feelies. Further, Harris suggests that the
feelies begin to go mad when they confront one another from opposite standpoints - the anti-abortionists and the
pro-abortionists - each claiming to sympathize with suffering, one with the murdered foetus, the other with the
coerced pregnant woman. This certainly has plausibility and is consistent with my own thesis that the feelies come
into conflict with one another, but they do not even have to take opposite positions. They come into conflict on
every single issue of means because they believe that once you know the end in your heart - the relief of suffering -
then you know the means, but each individual somehow manages to discover a different means. Otherwise, the
scenario Harris describes about the course of that madness corresponds to my own, except, as indicated earlier, the
governing principle behind it is not a search for the pure Good, but the relief of the suffering of others, and the
opposition is not simply one which identifies with any existing order. “(T)he heart itself goes mad when it asserts
that the actual order supported by other hearts is morally perverse.” (Harris, 470)
3. Cf.  Volume I of The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons for the Rwanda Experience,
Copenhagen: DANIDA, 1996.
4. 
5. For accounts of the influence of David Hume and Adam Smith on Hegel, see Norbert Waszek, “Hume, Hegel and
History,” Clio 14: 1985, 379-392, and his book The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel’s Account of Civil Society,
Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988.
6. This differentiates Smith’s sentimental theory from David Hume’s for whom the sentiment is a direct product of
the sentiments of others who may feel different than we do. (Cf. A Treatise on Human Nature, II,I, XI. See also T.D.
Campbell, Adam Smith’s Science of Morals, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971, pp. 94-103.
7. The Torah: A Modern Commentary, ed. Rabbi Gunther Plaut, New York:HUAC, 1981, p. 386;
the observation is credited to A. Neher.
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